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INTRODUCTION 
The power lines in the world are shifting and the growth of Asian countries and 
foremost The People’s Republic of China, South Korea and Japan has resulted in big 
changes in the world economy. This has also sparked interest among a number of 
scholars who are trying to explain the history, success and development of the East-
Asian countries. One of the most persisting questions seems to be concerned with the 
interdependency of Japan and China (Wirth 2009; Ching 2012; Wan 2014) and many 
still wonder (Gustafsson 2014; 2015; Cui 2012) how their different interpretations of 
the past could influence their relationship today.  
This topic has often been discussed in the context of Chinese nationalism and their 
construction of self-identity. Most scholars like Elena Atanassova-Cornelis (2012, 95) 
and Shogo Suzuki (2007, 26) agree that Japan plays a primary role in the enactment of 
the Chinese identity. They suggest that Neumann’s (1996) theory about “self” and 
“other” also applies to Chinese nationalism, and that most Chinese view Japan and the 
Japanese as the primary “other”. Suzuki (2007, 26) notes that this perception is mostly 
based on negative differences between the “in-group” and “out-group” and therefore 
suggests that Japan and the Japanese are perceived as the victimizing “other”. This 
perception reflects the Chinese official discourse which many scholars like K. Denton 
(2007) and Callahan (2004) claim can be described by an obsessive coverage of China’s 
victimization by the Japanese.  
Most of the research conducted on Chinese nationalism analyzes the top-down official 
discourse, and assumes that the Chinese public view Japan and the Japanese as the 
“other”. Very little bottom-up research has been conducted. Although there is some 
quantitative research conducted among the Chinese general populace (Naftali 2015), 
which claims that the Chinese do indeed see Japan as the negative “other”, we still lack 
in-depth understanding of how the Chinese perceive Japan and the Japanese in light of 
the much discussed historical confrontations. Due to its methodological constraints, 
quantitative analysis cannot explain how people actually feel about intricate and 
sensitive matters. Studies in this tradition have also failed to distinguish between 
different groups of the society and different areas of perceptions like history, politics, 
culture and technology.  
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There is also little evidence that the negative anti-Japanese sentiment applies to young 
and highly educated people. These are people who have no personal experience with the 
Japanese atrocities in China and are instead more and more influenced by the influx of 
Japanese pop-culture, technology and products. They usually live away from home and 
can be assumed to be less influenced by their parents’ and grandparents’ views. Since 
universities in China are generally more open to different discussions, it is also an 
environment where people can form their own elaborated opinions towards sensitive 
topics. Young highly educated people are also more in touch with the international 
community, have more direct contact with the Japanese people, and are likely to have 
more diverse information on the subject. Therefore it is important to analyze this group 
and their perceptions of Japan and the Japanese distinct from the general public.   
The goal of this research paper is to explore the different views and attitudes that the 
highly educated Chinese youths uphold towards Japan and the Japanese. It also intends 
to see how these views relate to the “self” and “other” framework. By interviewing ten 
graduate students at the Tsinghua University aged 23 to 24 and analyzing the interviews 
by using qualitative content analysis, this paper also tries to find explanations to these 
perceptions. It is important to note that this paper does not intend to make 
generalizations about the whole Chinese population.  
The following research paper consists of three main parts: theoretical background, 
methodology and analysis. The first section gives a brief overview of the theoretical 
background and focuses on three main topics. It first explains the concept of 
nationalism from the theoretical standpoint of “self” and “other”, and then moves on to 
give an overview of the Chinese nationalism and self-identity and Japan’s role in it. The 
second part explains briefly the methodological aspects of this research, followed by the 
third section where the ten conducted interviews are analyzed. In doing that the author 
first analyzes the general perceptions of the young interviewed students according to the 
“self” and “other” framework and distinguishes between perceived positive and 
negative differences and similarities. The discussion first focuses on culture, personality 
and technology and then on history and politics. The second part of the analysis intends 
to look for explanations for the respondents’ attitudes.  
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The following section gives an overview of the theoretical background of the research. 
The first section gives an overview of the theory of “othering” and of the construction 
of self-identity through the interaction with “others”. The author then focuses on the 
formation of Chinese nationalism and explains what part does Japan play in it. The last 
section establishes research questions and gives a brief overview of why it is necessary 
to conduct qualitative research in the light of already existing quantitative studies.  
1.1 Nationalism and the theory of “self” and “other” 
In order to explain what part does Japan play in the formation of the Chinese identity 
and nationalism, it is necessary to first give a brief introduction to the “self” and “other” 
theoretical framework and its connection to nationalism.   
Nationalism, as defined by Elina Sinkkonen (2013, 1047), is a view that one’s home 
country is superior to other countries and which therefore provides support for that 
country’s actions. The construction of nationalistic feelings and national identity has 
been explained differently by many scholars with some relying more on propaganda and 
others on different psychological theories.  
One approach that has lately caught most attention among the scholars researching 
international relations is the social identity theory. Rooted in psychology, this theory 
claims that an individual’s self-identity derives from a perceived membership in a 
certain social group and through the interaction with “others”.  
The problem of “self” and its many “others” has been one of the most persisting 
questions since the time of pre-Socratic philosophers (Paipais 2010, 121). Different 
scholars have tried to explain the phenomena differently, but the most common 
definition of “other” is something different from “self”. This phenomenon is something 
that can be observed in different dimensions in both everyday life and in international 
relations (De Buitrago 2012, xiii). 
Most scholars, such as Jonathan Mercer (1995, 242), argue that the universal desire for 
self-esteem results in large-scale cognitive differences between the “in-group” and “out-
group”, which then leads to attaching negative qualities to the “out-group” and positive 
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identity to the “in-group” (Mercer 1995, 242). This implies that the relationship 
between “self” and “other” can only be negative and involves a lot of conflicts.  
De Buitrago (2012, xv) points out that this is overly simplifying the theory and claims 
that the difference between self and other can also be described through positive content. 
Other scholars like Suzuki (2007) agree and therefore rely more on Neumann’s (1996, 
142) approach, which claims that identity formulation should be thought of as a 
“lineation of an ‘in-group’ which must necessarily entail delineation from a number of 
‘out-groups’”. This explanation, strongly concerned with the difference between groups, 
is more dynamic and involves both negative and positive dimensions.  
Although this explains how it is possible to explain “self” through the existence of 
“others”, it is also important to note that self-identity and therefore also nationalism can 
only form through social interaction with these “others”. This highlights the 
intersubjective essence of identity formation. As Suzuki (2007, 30) points out, the 
interaction with several “others” can also result in different and often overlapping forms 
of self-identities and which particular identity is dominant will depend on the particular 
moment.   
1.2 Chinese nationalism and self-identity 
As the previous section explained, the formation of self-identity and nationalism occurs 
through the interaction with others. This is also the case with Chinese nationalism. 
Many historians have suggested that the formation of the Chinese identity is strongly 
related to their encounters with the Western powers. Although there was a sense of 
belonging to the Chinese state already before their self-identity was not limited to 
certain territorial boundaries, but was more based on the continuum of culture versus 
barbarity (Suzuki 2007, 31).  
Signing the so-called Unequal Treaties in the 19
th
 century led the Chinese to 
conceptualize their self-identity more in line with the Western cultural norms and the 
concept of nation-state. The term guo (state) became gradually identified with the 
Chinese nation and their sense of belonging to the Chinese state became more visible 
(Suzuki 2007, 31). In order to provide unified resistance to the Western and Japanese 
imperialists and to build a powerful state, the leaders encouraged the people to imagine 
themselves as belonging to the “victimized” Chinese state (Suzuki 2007, 31-32). The 
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feeling of belonging to a Confucian Chinese culture was gradually replaced by a 
communal identity tied to China as a nation state.  
The narrative of “victimization” leads back to the period that started in the 19th century 
with The First Opium War and ended with the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949. The period is often referred to as the century of national humiliation 
and can be described as the master narrative of the modern Chinese history (Callahan 
2004, 204). As Callahan (2004, 204) explains it, the discourse recounts the century 
during which the Chinese were invaded by foreigners and ruled by corrupt regimes. 
Territories were taken away and sovereignty was lost. During this time the Chinese self-
awareness also began to increase through the interaction with “others”.   
It is important to note that the victimization narrative only emerged after the Tiananmen 
incident in 1989 and when Jiang Zemin took power in 1992. It was then that 
nationalism and the Chinese victimization became a dominant discourse. During the 
first decades of the People’s Republic of China and during the rule of Mao Zedong the 
dominant narrative was Chinese heroic resistance, which depicted China as a victor not 
as a victim (Coble 2011, 396-397). However in both narratives Japan has still been 
depicted as the “other.  
Although the formation of the Chinese self-awareness was first sparked by the Western 
powers, researchers like Elena Atanassova-Cornelis (2012, 95) believe it is Japan who 
has occupied a primary place in the enactment of the past aspect of Chinese identity. 
Shogo Suzuki (Suzuki 2007, 26) claims that many Chinese still remember the invasion 
by the Japanese army during the Second World War and the cruelty that they inflicted 
on innocent Chinese civilians. Many scholars like Parks M. Coble (2011, 379) agree 
and suggest that in today’s China the public memory of the Japanese invasion and the 
War of Resistance in 1937-1945 is more visible than ever. The discourse surrounding 
the War of Resistance can be described by an obsessive coverage of China’s 
victimization by the Japanese and the heroic narrative of resistance has been replaced 
with tragic horror stories (Denton 2007, 248).  
As Kaufman (2010) points out, it is often the defeats, humiliation and injustices related 
to Japan and Western powers that are paid close attention to and not the achievements 
of the Chinese people. The anti-Japanese sentiment is reflected in the whole Chinese 
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society through government-controlled media, school, textbooks, and even through 
large-scale anti-Japanese protests. The Anti-Japanese War has become the signature of 
the communists’ legitimacy and the Chinese unity, and the Japanese devils are one of 
the most important “others” in the Chinese official discourse (Ching 2012, 718).  
Researchers like Downs and Saunders (1998/99) claim that the Chinese government 
continuously uses the Japanese imperialistic history as a strategic tool to raise national 
awareness and to bargain on the political and international level. The narrative is used 
do legitimize the regime and is always enhanced during times of interior and 
international unrest. This suggests that the military confrontations with Japan have 
become what Volkan (2001, 88) describes as the “chosen trauma”, which can be 
characterized as shared pieces of past that become entrenched in people’s minds and 
link them together as a group. This “chosen trauma” can be reactivated by that same 
group or its leaders at any time to reconfirm or enhance their identity.   
Nevertheless it is important to note that even though history and this shared “chosen 
trauma” can be used for regime legitimation, it would not be possible to do this if that 
kind of rhetoric would not have an audience who would be receptive to this information 
(Suzuki 2007, 26). Even though China has had military confrontations with several 
other nations, none of these amount to the extent that the Japanese invasion did (Suzuki 
2007, 38).  
1.3 Research problem 
While researchers like Shogo Suzuki (2007) do a good work in explaining how the 
concepts of “other” and “victim” are used in the Chinese official discourse, and Elena 
Atanassova-Cornelis (2012) explains how Japan plays a primary role in the enactment 
of the Chinese identity, there is little evidence that the Chinese people today actually 
think of Japan and the Japanese people as the unified “other”. 
A research conducted in 2013 by Pew Research Center viewed the perceptions of Japan 
in Asia and the results indicated that 90% of the public in China has an unfavorable 
opinion of Japan and 78% of the populace doesn’t think that Japan has sufficiently 
apologized for its military actions during the 1930s and 1940s (Pew Research Center 
2013, 5). Although this seems to indicate the Chinese general view towards Japan as a 
country, it fails to distinguish between different perceptions towards Japan and the 
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Japanese people. Although the research looks into how the Chinese people see Japan 
politically it does not necessarily explain their views towards Japanese culture, 
technology and their people in general.  
Orna Naftali’s (2015) research among high school students seems to be more in depth 
and sensitive to the possibility of different attitudes towards Japan/Japanese among 
Chinese as a group and also as individuals. It shows that the consumption of Japanese 
pop-culture does not necessarily reverse the negative attitudes, but produces a “love-
hate” relationship (Naftali 2015). However, since this paper was only presented at the 
“All I Need Is Love? Nation, Affect and Aversion and a Post-Imagined-Community 
Asia” international workshop in Taipei and has not been published, its theoretical and 
methodological aspects remain vague.  
Although there is some research done among the general Chinese populace and also 
among Chinese high school students, there is still little evidence of how Chinese view 
Japan and the Japanese in more detail, and whether this anti-Japanese sentiment also 
characterizes the highly educated Chinese youths. Since universities in China are 
generally more opened to different discussions, it is safe to assume that university 
students are more free to form their own opinions towards sensitive topics. These are 
people who don’t have direct contact with the historical events related to Japan and who 
usually live away from home and are therefore less influenced by their parents’ views. 
Young people in China are more and more influenced by the influx of Japanese pop-
culture, technology and different products and seem to have more contact with Japanese 
people themselves. Given these considerations, the highly educated Chinese youths are 
more likely to have diverging opinions and attitudes towards Japan and the Japanese.  
This research aims to add to our understanding of Chinese nationalism. Most analysts of 
Chinese nationalism posit on the negative attitude towards Japan and the Japanese. As 
this study intends to demonstrate, this is not always the case and some Chinese view 
Japan and the Japanese also in a positive light. The main research question for this study 
is how do the highly educated young Chinese people perceive Japan and the Japanese. 
In addition, the author also tries to look for factors that could explain the interviewees’ 
attitudes. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
The following research paper aims to answer the research questions by qualitatively 
analyzing interviews conducted with young Chinese people. Since the matter at hand is 
complicated, and we assume that people might withhold sensitive information or not be 
aware of their beliefs, qualitative research design with its emphasis on the complexities 
on social life is best way to find answers to the posed questions.  
As qualitative research design tends to work with a relatively small number of cases and 
puts more focus on details (Silverman, Marvasti 2008, 14), information is gathered from 
ten Chinese youths. The interviewees are chosen by using convenience sampling. The 
author decided to limit the scope of the research paper and interview only people living 
in Beijing and studying in the same university. It is important to note that because the 
group of respondents is still relatively small, the author should avoid making 
generalizations. The goal of this research paper is to find different kinds of reactions to 
Japan among Chinese youths, and in order to make generalizations, this research should 
be complemented by other qualitative and also quantitative studies. Also, because of the 
interpretive nature of the technique, it is important to avoid being too subjective and 
biased in finding different meanings from the interviews to support the author’s own 
opinions.  
Exactly half of the respondents are male and half female. The interviewees come from 
different departments with some of them studying different types of engineering and 
others social sciences. All of the respondents are aged between 23 and 24 and are 
enlisted in a graduate program in Tsinghua University. These young Chinese have not 
lived during the Japanese aggression and their knowledge in this field comes either from 
outside sources like their parents, grandparents, media or school. Despite that, the 
people aged from 23 to 24 have usually lived away from their homes for several years 
and have started to form more thorough and elaborative opinions towards political and 
historical issues. Therefore the age of the respondents was limited accordingly. 
Because of the sensitive nature of the paper, the interviews were individual to have 
more in-depth discussions with each of the respondents. To encourage people to talk 
more about their own opinions, they were ensured that all of their answers will be 
confidential. To avoid anyone attaching names to any information used in this paper, all 
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the real names have been removed and instead the author uses aliases. This was done to 
secure that the respondents feel confident in expressing their own opinions and not what 
they think they should say.  
The interviews were half-structured to provide more flexibility during the process. The 
author used a topic guide (Extra 1) with some questions and key words to lead the 
discussion. Since the main research questions are strongly based on people’s opinions, 
feelings and thoughts, the author needed to be extra careful not to push the interviewees 
to answer in a certain way. However, the author is aware that the influence of her 
presence could not be fully eliminated. 
All the interviews were held in Tsinghua University Asian Youth Exchange Center in a 
room with only the interviewer and interviewee present. All the interviews were 
recorded on the permission of the interviewees with an audio recording device and later 
transcribed into text format. The interviews took place in the period between December 
19
th
, 2015 and January 20
th
, 2016. The length of the interviews varied from 19 minutes 
to 36 minutes.  
2.1 Content Analysis 
To find answers to the established research questions, the interviews are analyzed by 
using qualitative content analysis. Content analysis is concerned with meanings, 
intentions and contents and pays a lot of attention to interpreting texts, images and 
expressions and is therefore the best technique to use in this paper.  
Qualitative content analysis has its positive and negative aspects, but most importantly, 
it enables the author to be sensitive, precise and to pay attention to phenomena that are 
rare or unique (Kalmus, Masso, Linno 2015). Differently from quantitative analysis, 
qualitative measures help to approach every single respondent individually and to take 
into account their differences. Qualitative analysis enables to analyze all of the 
interviewee’s opinions and feelings separately and to pay attention to details. Therefore 
it helps to understand the interviewed Chinese youths’ attitudes towards Japan more 
thoroughly and to see if there are any exceptions in their opinions.  
The author uses the MAXQDA coding tool to help with the analysis. It means that the 
interviews will be analyzed by identifying different codes or categories to one or more 
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passages which all relate to one thematic idea (Gibbs 2007, 54). Differently from 
quantitative analysis, qualitative content analysis isn’t focused on coding text according 
to a certain fixed coding frame, but is more flexible in creating different codes and 
categories throughout the analysis (Kalmus, Masso, Linno 2015). Since most of the 
categories and concepts come from previously written research papers, the coding is 
more concept-driven (Gibbs 2007, 45), but it’s not exclusive. Some of the coding is on 
the contrary data-driven, which means that the codes are formed during the coding 
process and come from the data itself. This is done mostly to avoid subjectivity and to 
find not only conceptually defined phenomena but also contradicting and unusual signs.  
In the current analysis it means that in the first part of the analysis the author tries to 
find signs that the Chinese youths see Japan as being the “other”. In doing that the 
author relies on the definition used by Neumann (1996, 142), which defines identity 
formulation as a lineation of an ‘in-group’, which must necessarily entail delineation 
from a number of ‘out-groups’. Therefore the author looks for perceived differences. As 
the differences can be both negative and positive, the texts will be coded and analyzed 
accordingly. Since it occurred during the interviews that some of the young people see 
some similarities between the Chinese and Japanese, the author also looks for signs that 
the Chinese see the Japanese belonging to the same cultural group as themselves.    
The second part of the analysis tries to find explanations to how educated Chinese 
youths view Japan/Japanese. In doing that the author first uses five categories drawn 
from the interviews to define the sources of information: Home/parents/grandparents, 
Movies/TV Series, School/Textbooks, Media/Newspapers and War Museums. This part 
of the analysis tries to find out why do the respondents perceive Japan the way they do 
and where does this information come from. It also helps to briefly explain the official 
discourse and the way the interviewed young people see it.  
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3. ANALYSIS 
The following section gives an overview of information collected from the ten 
conducted interviews and analyzes the data according to the methodological and 
theoretical framework set in previous chapters. Firstly, the analysis focuses on 
analyzing the interviewees’ general views towards Japan. In doing that the author brings 
out the perceived negative and positive differences and also similarities in people’s 
opinions. This means that the analysis tries to see if and how do the interviewed youths 
see Japan as the “other” and whether this is solely based on perceived negative or also 
positive differences. Secondly, the author tries to find explanations to these perceptions 
by discussing the sources and reasons behind people’s views towards Japan.  
3.1 General perceptions of Japan 
The conducted interviews reflect a lot of different opinions, but one thing that stands out 
is that all of the respondents perceive Japan both in a positive and negative way. The 
following discussion focuses on both of these aspects and points out signs that some of 
the Chinese young people also see some similarities between the Chinese and Japanese. 
However, based on this analysis there is no way of telling whether this is characteristic 
only to the ten interviewees, the group of highly educated Chinese youths or to the 
whole Chinese populace. The section is divided into two parts – the first part focuses on 
culture, personality and technology and the second one on history and politics.  
3.1.1 Culture, personality and technology 
One of the most significant findings from the interviews was that the young interviewed 
Chinese people see Japan in a very diverse way. When it comes to the historical period 
before the 19th century, their thinking is relatively different from the period starting 
from the 19th century. Altogether seven respondents out of ten mentioned that the 
Chinese and Japanese can actually be considered relatively similar in some ways. This 
seems to imply that in some aspects Japan could actually be perceived as belonging to 
the same “self” with the Chinese. Several of the interviewees mentioned the Tang 
dynasty (618-906) and the positive relationship between the two countries at the time.  
“Several hundred years ago during Tang dynasty China was one of the most 
powerful and influential countries in the world. At that time Japan sent their 
diplomatic ambassadors to China, to learn from China. Actually they learned 
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everything from China at that time and even today at present Japanese culture 
and constitution is deeply impacted by China. You know the Japanese characters, 
I mean the language, it is also deeply impacted by Chinese.” (Li, male, 24 years 
old, major in international journalism and communications) 
This mentality reflected from several other interviews and it occurred that the young 
interviewees believe that the Japanese state and culture has roots in the ancient Chinese 
culture. They repeatedly mentioned the similarities between the two countries’ 
characters and traditions. One of the interviewees, a 24 year old electrical engineering 
student Huan, went as far as saying that the Japanese and Chinese could one day be 
united like Europe and therefore suggested that the Chinese and Japanese actually 
belong to the same “in-group”. At the same time he also pointed out that although the 
similarities do form a good basis for future cooperation, there are probably also too 
many differences that are impossible to change or overcome. These differences, which 
were mostly negative, will be further discussed in the next chapter.  
The previous discussion seems to clash with the claim that Japan is perceived as the 
“other” in China, and does not align with the definition of “other” that scholars like 
Suzuki (2007) and Neumann (1996) have used. While their definitions were only 
concerned with the differences between the “in-group” and “out-group” or in other 
words between “self” and “other”, the interviewees seemed to also perceive certain 
cultural similarities between the Chinese and Japanese. This suggests that in a way they 
consider the Japanese as being one of their own and as belonging to their image of 
“self”.   
As it was previously pointed out, all of these similarities seem to have roots in culture 
and with the change of topics the respondent’s views shifted more towards seeing 
differences between the Chinese and Japanese. When it comes to the Japanese mentality 
and personality in general, the views were still positive, but they were no longer 
perceived as being similar to the Chinese, but more as being positively different. One of 
the main perceived positive differences that the interviewees pointed out was the 
politeness of the Japanese people.  
“But I do really like Japanese people because they are very polite. Actually this 
term I got to know some of the Japanese people and they are really polite, much 
16 
 
more polite than the Chinese people. If you want to describe them in one word it 
would be polite.” (Zhen, female, 24 years old, major in earth sciences) 
The tendency to describe the Japanese people as being polite reflected in most of the 
interviews, but a lot of them believed that the biggest differences lie not only in their 
personality, but also in their way of thinking. A 23-year-old interviewee Ting noted that 
the Japanese delicate ways of thinking are among the main factors that have enabled 
Japan to develop to this successful country we see today and to do it a lot faster than 
others.  
“The Chinese people always like to imitate and the Japanese always like to see 
things in their own unique ways. And my impression of Japanese students is that 
they always take their little notebooks and note everything they see and make 
little marks. And Chinese people always just talk and talk about everything and 
like to gossip about what they see. That’s just a big comparison. So I think what 
the Japanese do is better.” (Ting, female, 23 years old, major in international 
journalism and communications) 
This reflects the differences between the Japanese and Chinese way of thinking, but it 
also points out differences between both countries’ technology and science. The 
Japanese people were seen as being more innovative – they pay much more attention to 
details and instead of just imitating things, they create things that are similar to the 
existing ones, but make them better and more advanced. The interviewees repeatedly 
mentioned Japan’s productivity in technology and science and the good quality of their 
products, which encourages the Chinese people to travel to Japan to buy things. 
Because of the good perceived quality of the products, several respondents used 
Japanese electronic products like their phones, cameras and rice cookers. In addition, 
one respondent, Zhen, praised the quality of Japanese make-up products and pointed out 
that they are the best in whitening your face, which is considered as a beauty ideal by 
many Chinese. One of the interviewees, Jing, compared Japanese quality with the 
German quality and another said that the Chinese should definitely learn something 
from the Japanese in this aspect. A mechanical engineering student Shu pointed out that 
in their department they do talk about Japanese technology a lot and think of it as role 
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model. She emphasized the good quality control in Japan and noted that they are 
extremely good at robotics and cutting edge technologies. 
This illustrates the Chinese mentality towards Japanese technology and production. The 
interviewed Chinese youths do see that they have something to learn from the Japanese 
and envy them for their quality control and innovation. The sentiment also seems to 
apply to the Japanese environment saving technologies and policies. This reflected 
especially in an interview conducted with Jing, a student from the department of 
environmental engineering, who was especially concerned about the troubling 
environmental situation in China and Beijing.  
“But yeah what I appreciate the most is that their environment is protected. And 
it’s better than in China. And there are also many kinds of environmental 
policies. At one point the environmental policy in Japan was also really bad, but 
they changed the conditions. And for a long time there were working units and 
now the environment is very good.” (Jing, female, 23 years old, major in 
environmental engineering) 
Apart from people’s good attitude, good technology, environment and products, the 
interviewees also had a somewhat positive view towards Japanese pop-culture. This 
sentiment especially applied to the Japanese animations, which several of the 
respondents not only watched when they were kids, but still watch them now when they 
are aged 23-24. A 24 year old software engineering student Peng noted that he could 
really be considered as an expert on Japanese animation because he has seen so many of 
them.  
Although most of the interviewees had a relatively positive view towards Japanese 
animations, their opinions towards Japanese movies and music varied largely. Several 
respondents were relatively neutral towards Japanese movies and music and said that 
they don’t really watch or listen to them, but at the same time they don’t really have 
anything specific against them. Two respondents described the Japanese movies either 
being too terrifying or too emotional and psychological. As the 24-year old Zhen 
pointed out, they only focus on psychological things and are therefore not that 
fascinating.  
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A similar argument came out in another interview where Peng, a 24-year-old student, 
mentioned that the different descriptions and atmosphere make the Japanese movies and 
novels too strange to watch or read. Although this seems to reflect the differences 
between the Chinese and Japanese thinking and preferences towards movies and novels, 
others like 23-year-old Ai had a whole different opinion and said that the psychological 
aspect in Japanese movies is what makes them good.  
When it comes to music, the respondents seemed to have a relatively neutral attitude. 
Some mentioned that they do listen to Japanese music occasionally, but none of them 
had anything really positive to say about it. One of the respondents, Zhen, just pointed 
out that the Japanese songs are relatively popular, but not as popular as Korean and 
therefore most people, including her, don’t listen to them that often. Overall the 
respondents didn’t seem to hold a really strong view towards Japanese pop-culture and 
although they did watch a lot of animations and enjoyed them, the views differed when 
it came to movies and were probably the most neutral towards Japanese music.  
The previous discussion suggests that the respondents have a relatively positive view 
towards Japan when it comes to culture and technology. It seems that Japan was not 
necessarily seen as the negative “other” and that the interviewed youths were able to see 
both positive differences and also similarities between the two countries. Although the 
positive differences align with the definitions of “self” and “other” used by Suzuki 
(2007) and Neumann (1996), and point out that Japan was overall still seen as the “other” 
by the interviewed youths, it suggests that it is not necessarily seen as the negative 
“other” but also as a positive one, just as De Buitrago (2012, xv) has pointed out.  
This raises a question though whether a group can be perceived as “self” in some areas 
and still be the “other” in other aspects? Suzuki (2007, 30) has noted that the interaction 
with several others can indeed result in different and often overlapping forms of self-
identities and which particular identity is dominant will depend on the particular 
moment. The views of the interviewed youths do confirm this claim, but also suggest 
that the respondents’ perceptions of Japan and whether they see them as belonging to 
their “self” or as being the “other” depends on the area that is discussed at that moment.  
19 
 
3.1.2 Historical and political perceptions 
Although the views towards Japanese culture and economy were relatively positive, the 
opinions became more negative when the interview topics moved away from culture 
and towards history and politics. The negative attitudes seemed to draw from more 
recent history and as several of the respondents pointed out most of the negative 
incidents that have caused their bad attitude towards Japan took place during and after 
the 19th century. This is also in accordance with the narrative of national humiliation, 
which according to Callahan (2004) deprives from the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century and 
recounts the century during which the Chinese were invaded by foreigners and ruled by 
corrupt regimes.  
The interviews suggest that when it comes to history, the respondents see Japan in a 
really negative light and that they see them as being the victimizing “other”. Every 
single interviewee mentioned the Second World War (WWII) and the cruelty that the 
Japanese inflicted on the Chinese at that time. One student pointed out that the WWII 
can be probably considered as the most important historical event that influences the 
two countries’ relationship today.   
When asked to talk about a specific historical event that is related to both Japan and 
China, all of the respondents pointed out the Second World War and especially the 
Nanjing massacre, which is considered by many as the most gruesome event in Chinese 
history and the Japanese held responsible for it. The Nanjing massacre (also known as 
the Rape of Nanking) took place between December 1937 and January 1938. During 
this short period the Japanese soldiers invaded the city and murdered, raped and tortured 
hundreds of thousands of men, women and children; the estimated death tolls vary 
between 200,000 and 350,000 (Magclasscn 2015, 17). 
In eight interviews out of ten, the Nanjing massacre was mentioned as the event that the 
respondents first remember when they think about Sino-Japanese relations in the past. 
Most of the respondents who described the Nanjing massacre pointed out the horrible 
acts done by the Japanese and also brought examples of the killing competitions that the 
Japanese soldiers held. 
“In fact, in November last year I visited Nanjing and there was a famous 
historical building explaining the “tusha” (English translation: massacre). It 
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meant that the Japanese people invaded Nanjing and killed many people there 
and they even had something like a killing competition. They seemed to like it 
and they didn’t treat Chinese people like people. They were just killing for fun 
and were really cruel.” (Shu, female, 23 years old, major in mechanical 
engineering) 
This describes the common view that the respondents had towards the Nanjing massacre, 
the Second World War and the Japanese soldiers. They saw that it still influences their 
thinking and complicates the relations between the two countries and their people. The 
youths also mentioned that what bothers them the most about the history is that the 
Japanese still think of it differently. The example of Japanese textbooks telling a 
different and therefore a wrong story in the eyes of the Chinese was pointed out several 
times.  
 “And another thing with Japan is that their government changed the content of 
their history textbooks so that they are denying the things that they did to China 
or to other countries. I think it’s very unfair. Even to your own people it’s not 
fair. People have the right to know everything, to know the truth.“ (Shu, female, 
23 years old, major in mechanical engineering) 
The textbook controversy also pointed out the negative attitude towards Japanese 
leadership. All of the respondents were extremely negative towards Japanese politics, 
especially when it came to how they handle the war-related topics. None of the 
respondents had a positive attitude towards Japanese politics and many of them said that 
they do not like it at all. What most of the interviewees saw as being really negative was 
the fact that the Japanese politicians still pay visits to the temples where the Japanese 
war heroes are worshipped. Several respondents pointed out that the Japanese leaders 
still treat the Second World War soldiers as heroes and noted that this is unacceptable 
and will keep causing conflicts in the future.  
The problems surrounding the temple visits are also strongly related to the fact that the 
respondents felt that the Japanese haven’t still sincerely apologized for the world war 
killings and invasion and haven’t therefore expressed any regret. The same phenomenon 
also came out in the qualitative research done by the Pew Research Center (2013). One 
of the respondents, Li, also considered this as the main reason why most people, 
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including him, don’t like Japan and Japanese and why they can never identify 
themselves as belonging to the same group with them. The interviewees continuously 
compared Japan to Germany by saying that the Japanese should have followed their 
example and apologized for their cruelty.  
“When I talk to some German people, they will say that the World War II is too 
bad and Hitler is too bad. But the Japanese don’t think so. They don’t feel so 
sorry for that history I think.“ (Peng, male, 24 years old, major in chemical 
engineering) 
The interviewees felt that the Japanese avoid talking about the Second World War and 
that by doing it they are showing disrespect towards the Chinese people. One 
respondent, Ting, even compared Japan to small children who refuse to admit their 
mistakes and said that by doing this Japan loses all authority both among Chinese 
people and also on the international stage. Another young interviewee, Peng, also 
pointed out that what bothers him the most isn’t what the Japanese did in the past, but 
the fact that they don’t admit doing it. So in a way it suggests that although the 
perception of Japan being the “other” comes from history, the current political situation 
enhances this image even more.  
Although the previously discussed attitudes reflect mostly on Sino-Japanese history, the 
negative perceptions also occurred when the respondents talked about political issues 
that do not have an obvious connection to history and especially to the century of 
national humiliation. Several respondents mentioned the territorial disputes like the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute and said that this also influences their overall view of 
Japan. Li also mentioned the latest change in the Japanese constitution which states that 
the Japanese government is now allowed to send its troops to foreign countries and 
pointed out that this has made people’s attitude towards Japan even worse. This change 
seemed to bring back old memories from the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century and once again 
strengthen the image of Japan as the negative “other”.  
These political issues seemed to be mostly connected with the current Japanese leaders 
and especially to the current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The interviewed young people 
saw the Japanese leading politicians as being arrogant and insensitive. Li pointed out 
that he strongly dislikes their current Prime Minister and considers him as being 
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provocative. At the same time he noted that he does not necessarily connect the 
Japanese politicians’ actions with the Japanese people.  
“So I do like the Japanese people, but I don’t like the Japanese politics. 
Especially Shinzo Abe, the prime minister. He is quite provacative“ (Li, male, 24 
years old, major in international journalism and communications) 
Therefore it occurred from this interview and also from several others that although the 
attitude towards Japanese politics was extremely negative among the respondents, this 
does not necessarily have to influence their opinion of the Japanese people, culture and 
economy. In a way this suggests that even though the interviewees do perceive Japan as 
being the negative “other” in many ways, they are still able to distinguish between 
Japan as a political entity and the Japanese people in general.  
But even though the respondents did not necessarily connect the historical and political 
issues to the Japanese people in general, they still felt that it influences their attitude. A 
24 year old student Chen explained that since the Japanese come from a different 
environment and the Chinese discourse enhances the bad things that the Japanese have 
done to them, it is almost impossible to have a good attitude towards them. Others 
pointed out that it is okay to have Japanese friends and that they do have them, but that 
they could never become really close with them, because of their different views 
towards history. 
 “Yeah I kind of tried to talk about it, but it turns out you can never get to the 
same point with them. And they will go to another part of the history, because 
they are taught different things I think.” (Ting, female, 23 years old, major in 
international journalism and communications)  
The contradicting views towards history were not the only reasons why the respondents 
felt that they could not become close with the Japanese. Although it was explained in 
the previous chapter that the interviewed youths see the two countries’ cultures as being 
relatively similar, they also perceived some large differences between them. An 
electrical engineering student Huan pointed out an interesting difference between the 
two countries’ attitudes towards pornography. He noted that while in China everything 
related to sex and pornography is taboo and people have a relatively conservative and 
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traditional mentality, the Japanese are really open-minded about it and have a very large 
sex-industry.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding here is that the same respondent, who pointed out 
the big differences between the Chinese and Japanese people, was also the one who 
believed that the similarities between the two cultures could form a good basis for 
uniting like Europe. So although he did see that Japan could in a way belong the 
Chinese “self”, he also suggested that there are still differences that the two countries 
cannot overcome. Several other interviewees also noted that the two countries and their 
people have a really different mentality and that this is probably not easy to overcome.   
„I think the Japanese are actually different from the Chinese. You know we have 
different philosophy. I think China is a country who doesn’t want to fight wars 
with any other country. You can see that China used to be the strongest power in 
the whole world for several hundred years. But you have rarely seen that China 
ever reached a war with a country around it, even when China was the strongest. 
But you see with Japan, Second World War. At that time Japan was not the 
strongest, but it was still there to challenge America. So you can see it from this 
aspect that we have different philosophy. Japan always wants to send their boats 
out of this small island. They want to find a large room. This is why this country 
is so ambitious. But China is not as ambitious as this country.” (Li, 24 years old, 
major in international journalism and communications) 
This illustrates most of the respondents’ views towards Japan and the Japanese when it 
comes to them as a group and as a political entity. The students saw the Chinese as 
being relatively pacifistic and as being against war in principle, but Japan was on the 
other hand seen as an aggressor who sees war as a way for human development. The 
respondents also perceived the Japanese as being respectful towards China only when 
it’s at its strongest and they noted that Japan always wants to be stronger and bigger and 
is therefore ambitious and sees war as the best way to achieve its goals.   
These perceived differences, rooted not only in history but in their whole mentality, 
seem to suggest that although the respondents do see that there are some positive 
differences and even similarities between China and Japan, they still perceive Japan 
mostly as the negative “other”. In other words, even though they sometimes speak of 
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the Japanese and Japan as belonging to the same “in-group” or refer to them as a 
positive “other”, they at the same time emphasize the political and historical problems 
between China and Japan. The discussion suggests that this is mostly the result of the 
perceptions rooted in the historical period that Callahan (2004) has described as the 
century of national humiliation, but is further enhanced by the political situation and the 
overall mentality of the Japanese. On a more individual and also cultural level, Japan 
can still be considered as being a positive “other” or even belonging to their “self”, but 
this does not necessarily change the perception of Japan being the negative “other” in 
other aspects. Therefore the interviewed youths seemed to have very diverse and 
elaborated opinions when it comes to Japan and their attitude and the fact which self-
identity is dominant strongly depends on the particular moment and the area or topic 
discussed.  
3.2 Explanations and reasons 
As the previous section pointed out, the interviewees’ opinions are relatively diverse 
when it comes to different aspects like politics, history, economics and culture. 
Although the respondents perceive Japan as a negative “other” when it comes to history 
and politics, they are able to identify the Japanese as a positive “other” or even as 
belonging to their “self” when it comes to culture and technology. This section 
describes how the respondents’ perceptions of negative “other” are more associated 
with information from school textbooks and storytelling from parents and grandparents, 
and how the perceptions of positive “other” and “in-group” affiliations are more 
associated with information from media and first-hand contact with Japanese people and 
their technology.  
3.2.1 Reasons for negative perceptions 
Although previous research suggests that the general population in China has an 
extremely negative view towards Japan, the interviewed Chinese youths did not seem to 
exactly follow the line. Orna Naftali’s (2015) research among high school children 
indicated that the consumption of Japanese pop-culture produces a love-hate 
relationship with Japan and its culture, but the analysis conducted here among Chinese 
university students suggests something a bit more complex. Although the respondents 
did see the negative aspects in Japanese politics and history, they also managed to see 
the positive in Japanese culture, economics, people, and even in some political aspects 
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like their environment. The biggest question here is that why are their opinions so 
different towards certain aspects and why is Japan considered as a negative or positive 
“other” in some and as a “self” in other aspects.  
The main reasons behind this seem to lie in the fact where do the respondents get their 
information from and how does this information look like. When asked for the sources, 
most of the respondents pointed out that the most important ones are media and 
newspapers, school and textbooks, and movies and TV-series. Although all of them are 
interrelated, it seems that most of the political and historical information first comes 
from school, then from movies and TV-shows and finally from media.  
Several respondents pointed out that the first and main place where they get their 
information about Japan is school. The interviewees explained that they start learning 
the Sino-Japanese history already in primary school and as they grow older the learning 
process becomes more meticulous. Usually these classes continue even in universities 
because to get into a post-graduate program every individual must take examinations 
where they have to know the Chinese history and also the parts of it related to Japan.  
“We learned the history between China and Japan from elementary school. Even 
at college we still learn about the history between Japan and China. We learn 
about the history of the Second World War. How Japan has impacted China, 
how the Japanese soldiers killed Chinese people.“(Li, male, 24 years old, major 
in international journalism and communications) 
This suggests that the main source of information for the Chinese youths is still school 
and its textbooks. At the same time it could also explain the negative view towards 
Japanese history and politics, because as several of the respondents pointed out, the 
history courses mainly focus on the negative aspects of the two countries’ relationship. 
Chun, a 24-year-old software engineering student, phrased it like this: 
„There’s not much positive there. I remember that in my history book the only 
positive thing about Japan is when China was building a good relationship with 
Japan after the PRC’s establishment. That is the only good aspect of that. Before 
that it was war, war, war.“ (Chun, 24 years old, major in software engineering) 
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Even though it is not certain that it is definitely school that creates the negative image 
that the respondents had towards Japanese politics and history, it is obvious that the 
young people do perceive the information they have gotten from school as being more 
negative. And as Li pointed out, they are really not allowed to not learn about these 
things. It is compulsory for all the students in China to know all the important facts 
about the Sino-Japanese history.  
Another interesting thing that four respondents mentioned was that they are required to 
watch certain movies in class which describe the gruesome acts done by the Japanese 
during the Second World War. Two students described a movie called “Unit 731”, 
which pictures a Japanese unit doing experiments on Chinese people. Their memories of 
the movie seemed to still be very vivid, even after several years of watching it.  
“For example, they froze your hand, arms in a very low degree and then poured 
some boiling water on it. And they just heated the arm and the arm falls off. 
Things like that.“ (Ai, female, 23 years old, major in software engineering)  
As another student, Chun, noted that he does not know why they show them the movie, 
but it certainly gives them a terrible impression of the war between China and Japan. In 
addition, the respondents pointed out the depressing pictures of the wartime horrors and 
the sad stories that the teachers tell. This seems to explain the negative attitude towards 
Japan when it comes to history and politics and also confirms the fact that the Chinese 
official discourse does strongly focus on the negative aspects of Japan and paints a 
picture of them as the victimizing “other”.  
Besides school, more than half of the respondents felt that one of the biggest sources 
where they receive information about Japan is television. In addition to the movies that 
the Chinese children are required to watch in class, the interviewees mentioned that 
there are a lot of fiction movies about Japan on the television. Several respondents 
mentioned the dramas that focus on the noble Chinese and inhumane Japanese soldiers 
and pointed out that the Japanese are always pictured as ugly, rude, and stupid in the 
movies. 
“And also, there are a lot of movies, a lot of movies. In every single movie from 
that period the Japanese have very bad characters and they are very ugly. Not 
ugly, but very rude and stupid. And the movies play a very important role. Like 
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when you’re a kid and you open the TV and people always like to, especially my 
father likes to watch these kinds of movies.” (Huan, male, 24 years old, major in 
electrical engineering, economics)   
All of the interviewees had seen similar movies that describe the war between the 
Chinese and Japanese and which all tell a negative story about the Japanese. According 
to them, the movies are on every single channel and everyone can watch them at any 
time they want. This also seems to confirm the fact that several scholars like Denton 
(2007, 248) have suggested that the current official discourse in China can be described 
by an obsessive coverage of Chinese victimization by the Japanese. This kind of 
storytelling seems to create negative perceptions, strengthen the perception of Japan as 
the “other” and also to complicate the relations between the Chinese and Japanese even 
today.  
“But when I was watching some materials like books and films about Japan, I 
just go extremely crazy and think that I really don’t like Japan or Japanese. But 
after finishing reading or watching that and some time has passed, I kind of 
forget that feeling.” (Ai, 23 years old, major in software engineering) 
The previous paragraph suggests that the movies do have some influence on the 
respondents’ views and attitudes, but that this influence might not last for long. 
Nevertheless, the image that seems to be a representation of a “chosen trauma” (Volkan 
2001) still seems to stay in people’s minds and can be reactivated at a particular 
moment by discussing these same sensitive topics. One respondent, Chun, expressed his 
opinion that the Chinese should stop creating these kinds of TV-series and movies 
because it only enhances negative emotions and does not necessarily have a good 
purpose. Another respondent had a completely different idea and believed that the 
movies are a way to help people to remember the past. Therefore, while some 
interviewees question the state policies and the propagation of Sino-Japanese animosity, 
others do not necessarily perceive it.  
“Yeah, that’s the mainstream view that all the Chinese people should remember 
that. And we should remember that history. Maybe the fact how we react to it 
will change, but facts should never be forgotten.” (Ai, 23 years old, major in 
software engineering) 
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Several other respondents seemed to agree to the fact that the movies do a good job at 
keeping the memories alive and helping people to see the bad in the past and good in 
today. One of the respondents, Shu, pointed out that every single Chinese person should 
know what happened in the past because there is something to learn from all of this. It 
ought to remind people that they should keeping working hard because in order to avoid 
this kind of horror China should remain strong and not fall back to how they were 
during the Second World War. This is in accordance with Volkan’s (2001, 88) theory 
that suggests that over generations such historical events, which he defines as “chosen 
traumas”, become more than a memory. Instead they transform into shared pieces of the 
past that link members of one group together. So in a way it seems that the respondents 
perceive the negative historical events related to Japan as this “chosen trauma” that 
makes them feel more connected to the Chinese “self”.  
Another source that the respondents saw giving a lot of information about Japan and 
helping them to remember the past, was media. Some young students saw that the 
media coverage of Japan differs depending on the time and of the situation between 
Japan and China. Several even suggested that China uses Japan and their history with 
them as a weapon and the best way to spread their message is through media.  
“So if they want to send some message they can very easily achieve that goal 
and they want to hide some message they can do that too. So it’s that the people 
are influenced by the media and the media is controlled by the government. So 
when there is something going on between China and Japan and the government 
wants people to have a specific attitude then the government can spread the 
message through media and influence people.” (Chen, male, 24 years old, major 
in hydraulic engineering) 
Other interviewed youths also pointed out that spreading negative stories about Japan 
through media and also through other sources is the government’s way to make 
everyone think the same and to make people fight against the Japanese. Others went 
further and explained that making people hate Japan is the government’s way of hiding 
the problematic situation in China, which supports the argument that a “chosen trauma” 
can be reactivated by a group or its leaders at any time to reconfirm or enhance their 
own identity (Volkan 2001, 88). 
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“Also I think the Chinese government also takes advantage of the bad 
relationship between China and Japan to minimize the conflicts inside our 
country. So they need the bad relationship between Japan and China to some 
extent. If all the people hate Japan, maybe they will not pay so much attention to 
the bad situation inside China. It’s like the government takes advantage of this to 
transfer the conflicts.” (Peng, male, 24 years old, major in chemical engineering) 
This view also supports the phenomenon that several scholars like Downs and Saunders 
(1998/99) have suggested that China does use its history with Japan as a strategic tool. 
The respondents felt that the history with Japan makes them feel more nationalistic and 
that Japan is an imaginary enemy in their eyes. This also supports the theory that the 
formation of self-identity takes place through the interaction with several “others”, 
which was especially emphasized in Suzuki’s (2007) research.  
“Japan is the imaginary enemy. Without Japan and without what they have done 
to us, maybe we would not have an imaginary enemy on our mind. We wouldn’t 
know who is our enemy. So we wouldn’t have the sense of patriotism towards 
our country.” (Li, male, 24 years old, major in international journalism and 
communications) 
The image of Japan as being an enemy seemed to also be enhanced by the respondents’ 
parents and grandparents who have had more direct contact with the Second World War 
events. Several of the interviewees had grandparents or relatives who had suffered 
because of the Japanese invasion and who had told them stories about the terrible times 
that they had to live through.  
“Actually my relatives, one of my relatives, he used to be a soldier in the 
Chinese troops and he fought against the Japanese invasion. So he told me that 
Japanese soldiers were really cruel to people and they just killed people, raped 
people and actually they did all kinds of inhuman things to the Chinese.” (Li, 
male, 24 years old, major in international journalism and communications) 
Some others told stories about how their grandparents’ lives were changed because of 
the Japanese invasion and how they had to hide in the mountains just to stay alive. The 
stories they heard seemed to influence the students’ views on a small level, but since 
they were stories that the respondents themselves had no contact with, it did not affect 
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them as much as their grandparents or parents. So although they understood that the 
history is indeed negative, it did not influence their views towards Japan in other aspects.   
3.2.2 Reasons for positive perceptions 
The interviews suggested that the group of respondents in this research have much more 
diverse opinions of Japan and the Japanese than what previous studies have claimed. 
One of the sources, which seemed to paint a more diverse picture of Japan, was media. 
Although it was pointed out in the previous section that the respondents feel that media 
can be used as a tool to spread negative messages about Japan, it was seen as the 
channel that focuses also on positive aspects. One respondent, Ting, pointed out that she 
feels that media and newspapers today talk more about the positive aspects of Japan like 
their technology and economy than the negative. As others noted, this media coverage is 
changing constantly depending on the political situation between China and Japan and 
also inside China.  
One of the main factors that seemed to explain the young highly educated youths’ 
positive perceptions and also in-group affiliations was direct contact with the Japanese 
people. Since Tsinghua University has a lot of foreign students, including Japanese, 
having contact with them is relatively easy. Most of the interviewees pointed out that 
they have Japanese friends and at least one respondent had travelled to Japan herself. 
Therefore their knowledge of Japan didn’t derive only from school, media, television or 
their parents and grandparents, but also from the Japanese people themselves. They had 
learned to know these people and formed their own opinions of their personalities and 
culture.  
While discussing their own perceptions and their experience with the Japanese people, 
the respondents also differentiated themselves from people from older generations and 
those living in the countryside, and in a way perceived them as the “other”. They felt 
that their opinions are more one-sided and tend to be really negative. They saw that 
since these people have more emotional connection to the negative history and no direct 
contact with the Japanese people today, they base their opinions on the stories they hear 
from school, movies or media.  
“Because maybe ordinary Chinese people still hate Japan a lot. Like one of our 
friends in Building 6 wants to bring his Japanese friend home for the new year, 
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but when his parents heard that they said no that’s impossible, he will be 
attacked if he would go to the countryside to his home. It’s totally impossible. So 
maybe some ordinary people still are indeed influenced by the government and 
they really hate Japanese no matter who it is.” (Peng, male, 24 years old, major 
in chemical engineering) 
Since the people Peng described hadn’t had any positive contact with the Japanese 
people today, they seemed to base their opinion of the whole country and its people on 
the negative memories and the stories they had heard. Although the young interviewees 
were taught about the Sino-Japanese history and they had heard negative stories from 
school, television and media, their opinions were more diverse. Their contact with the 
Japanese people had enabled them to see Japan from different aspects and to perceive 
Japan not only as the negative “other” but also as a positive one. In addition, it enabled 
them to identify themselves as belonging to the same “in-group” with the Japanese 
when it came to culture.  
Another interesting finding from the interviews was that the respondents themselves 
explained their more positive views towards Japan also through education and saw the 
less educated people as being the “other”. As it was mentioned before, all of the 
respondents in this research are postgraduate students currently enrolled in various 
master’s programs in one of the most prestigious universities in China, Tsinghua 
University. They felt that their views differ largely from their classmates’ views from 
middle and primary school, who they believe are not able to see complicated matters 
from different perspectives.  
“And I think my classmates from middle and primary school are more easy to be 
influenced. They comment on the internet and are much more aggressive 
towards Japan.” (Huan, male, 24 years old, major in electrical engineering, 
economics) 
Several others explained that it seems that the people with a lower education have more 
negative views and that bigger objectivity comes with education. As one respondent 
Zhen suggested, the history is just the past for the well-educated people, but the less 
educated seem to reflect the bad actions done by some Japanese soldiers or by Japanese 
politicians to the whole population. As the interviews suggested, the young highly 
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educated youths were indeed able to see the negative Sino-Japanese history, but their 
direct contact with the Japanese people enabled them to also consider the positive 
aspects about Japanese people and their culture. 
The interviews also reflected the respondents’ positive views towards Japanese 
technology, which seemed to be the result of having contact with their products. All of 
the interviewees mentioned using Japanese products and claimed that their quality is 
really good. They also pointed out that the Japanese technology and their quality 
measures are considered as positive examples in some of their engineering classes.  
At the same time it is important to note that although direct contact with the Japanese 
people and their products resulted in positive perceptions, the same phenomenon did not 
apply for pop-culture. Although the Chinese young people admitted having quite a lot 
of contact with the Japanese pop-culture, such as music, movies and TV-series, they did 
not necessarily have considerably positive attitudes towards it. It seemed to improve 
people’s views towards Japanese culture on a small scale, but since the movies, books 
and music seemed to be targeted to the Japanese people, whose mindset was seen as 
being different, the respondents did not feel connected to them.  
 
Overall, the different opinions among the respondents seem to be explained through the 
sources of information, experience and contact. It seems that the negative perceptions 
towards Japan as a political entity deprive from school, media and movies, which all 
represent the official discourse of the government. The positive perceptions and “in-
group” affiliations appear to come from media and their personal experience with both 
the Japanese people and their technology and culture. But although this is what the 
previous analysis suggests, the sources are not efficient to prove this. Thus, this area 
still needs further research.  
It occurred from the analysis that the younger generation was relatively self-conscious 
in a way that they were able to perceive both differences and similarities between 
themselves and the Japanese. The respondents were able to consider the Japanese as 
belonging to their “self” in some, but at the same time still perceive them as a positive 
or negative “other” in other aspects. They had also noticed that the negative history with 
Japan does indeed make them feel more patriotic and connected to their own country, 
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but they also felt that the government sometimes uses this “chosen trauma” as a 
strategical tool to spark nationalistic feeling.  
Although the interviewees were aware of the negative history between the two countries, 
they believed that this is not the only thing that characterizes Japan and the Japanese. 
Their answers reflected that in some areas Japan was considered as belonging to their 
“self” and the people who are only able to see Japan as the negative “other” were 
perceived as being different and belonging to an “out-group”. These were mostly people 
from older generations and with a lower education level. The respondents felt that these 
people’s attitudes were solely based on the negative history and the stories that they had 
heard. On the contrary, the group of respondents had had actual contact with Japanese 
people and therefore their opinions didn’t only derive from other’s experiences, but also 
from their own contact with the Japanese people, their culture and technology.  
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CONCLUSION 
The formation of the Chinese self-identity through the interaction with “others” and 
foremost with the Japanese has been researched and explained by many studies (Suzuki 
2007; Atanassova-Cornelis 2012). Nevertheless, most of them are based on the 
assumption that the Chinese public views Japan as the negative and monolithic “other”, 
and fail to analyze individual opinions and attitudes concerning complicated and 
controversial matters in Sino-Japanese relations. There is also little evidence that this 
anti-Japanese sentiment applies to young and highly educated people. Therefore, the 
aim of this thesis was to see how the educated Chinese youths perceive Japan and the 
Japanese and how this relates to the “self” and “other” framework.  
The analysis suggested that the respondents have really diverse and elaborated opinions 
when it comes to Japan and the Japanese; and that their attitudes towards Japan depend 
on the particular topic discussed. The interviews indicated that although Japan was 
mostly considered as the “other”, this was not solely based on negative differences but 
also positive ones. These positive differences were mostly related to the Japanese 
people, culture and technology and the main things that the respondents pointed out 
were the politeness of the Japanese people, their delicate ways of thinking and the high 
quality of their products.  
One of the most interesting findings was that the interviewees were very self-conscious 
and were able to consider the Japanese as belonging to their “self” in some and as the 
“other” in different areas. But although they did perceive some similarities between the 
Chinese and Japanese culture and even suggested that the two countries could one day 
unite, their attitudes turned more negative when the topics moved away from culture to 
history and politics. They felt that the memories from the 19
th 
to 20
th
 century, which 
Callahan (2004) describes as the century of humiliation, are still vivid in people’s minds 
and the fact that the Japanese leaders have not sufficiently apologized for their actions is 
enhancing the negative image even more. In addition, they felt that the whole Japanese 
mentality is different from the Chinese and that this is something that is really difficult 
to change. This indicates that the respondents were able distinguish between Japanese 
culture, technology and other spheres of life from Japanese politics, and also separate 
Japanese people from their politicians. 
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The respondents’ views and their more elaborative attitudes towards Japan seemed to be 
explained through several factors, such as age, education, experience and personal 
contact with the Japanese. It appeared that the negative perceptions towards Japan as a 
political entity derived from school, media and movies, which all represent the official 
standpoint of the government. The positive perceptions seemed to come from media and 
from having personal contact and experience with the Japanese people, their products 
and culture. As all of the interviewed students had had contact with Japanese people, 
they were able to identify themselves as belonging to the same “self” with the Japanese 
in some, but still see the negative aspects about Japan in other areas. The interviewees 
pointed out that this differentiates them from older generations and from those with a 
lower education who they felt had a more negative attitude towards Japan and the 
Japanese.  
Since the number of interviewees was relatively small in this thesis, it is not possible to 
make generalizations for the whole population. This research simply indicates that the 
respondents in this research have very elaborative opinions and while they consider 
Japan as being the “other” in most aspects, they are still able to see them as a positive 
“other” or as a “self” in others. The author suggests that this topic should be further 
researched to make generalizations and to see if the different groups in the Chinese 
society do perceive Japanese differently and whether their opinions differ depending on 
the subject matter discussed. 
  
36 
 
REFERENCES 
Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena. 2012. “Chinese Nation Building and foreign Policy: Japan 
and the US as the Significant ‘Others’ in National Identity Construction.” East Asia. 
Vol 29 (1). P 95-108. 
Callahan, William C. 2004. “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese 
Nationalism.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Poltical. Vol 26 (2). P 199-218. 
Ching, Leo. 2012. “Japanese Devils”. Cultural Studies. Vol 26 (5). P 710-722. 
Coble, Parks M. 2011. “Writing about Atrocity: Wartime Accounts and their 
Contemporary Uses“ Modern Asia Studies. Vol45 (2). P379-398. 
Cui, Shunji. “Problems of Nationalism and Historical Memory in China’s Relations 
with Japan.” Journal of Historical Sociology. Vol 25 (2). P 199-222 
De Buitrago, Sybille Reinke. 2012. Portraying the Other in International Relations : 
Cases of Othering, Their Dynamics and the Potential for Transformation. Newcastle 
upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 
Denton, K. 2007. „Horror and Atrocity: Memory of Japanese Imperialism in Chinese 
Museums.“ In Re-envisioning the Chinese Revolution: The Politics and Poetics of 
Collective Memories in Reform China, eds. Lee, C. K. and Yang, G. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press  
Downs, Erica Strecker; Saunders, Phillip C. 1998/99. „Legitimacy and the limits of 
nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands“. International Security. Vol23 (3). P114–
146. 
Gibbs, Graham R. 2007. Analysing Qualitative Data. ed. Uwe Flick. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Gustafsson, Karl. 2014. “Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese 
Relations.” Asian Studies Review. Vol 38 (1). P 71-86 
Gustafsson, Karl. 2015. “Identity and Recognition: Remembering and Forgetting the 
Post-War in Sino-Japanese Relations.” Pacific Review. Vol 28 (1). P 117-138. 
37 
 
Kalmus, Veronika; Masso, Anu; Linno, Merle. 2015. “Kvalitatiivne sisuanalüüs.” 
http://samm.ut.ee/kvalitatiivne-sisuanalyys (March 26, 2016) 
Kaufman, Alison Adcock. 2010. “The ‘Century of Humiliation,’ Then and Now: 
Chinese Perceptions of the International Order.” Pacific Focus. Vol 25 (1). P 1-33 
Magclasscn, Brian N. 2015. “The Willful Ignorance of Japan’s Past.” Chinese American 
Forum. Vol 31 (1). P 15-20 
Mercer, Jonathan. 1995. “Anarchy and Identity”. International Organization. Vol 49 (2). 
P 229-52  
Naftali, Orna. 2015. “The Attitudes of Chinese Youth towards Japan: Education, 
Nationalism, and Popular Culture Consumption.” Presented at the "All I Need Is Love? 
Nation, Affect and Aversion in a Post-Imagined-Community Asia" International 
Workshop in International Taiwan Normal University, Taipei; Abstract available at 
https://www.academia.edu/12352576/The_Attitudes_of_Chinese_Youth_towards_Japa
n_Education_Nationalism_and_Popular_Culture_Consumption (May 5, 2016) 
Neumann, Iver B. 1996. “Self and Other in International Relations.” European Journal 
of International Relations. Vol 2 (2). P 139-174. 
Paipais, Vassilios. 2010. “Self and other in critical international theory: assimilation, 
incommensurability and the paradox of critique”. Review of International Studies. Vol 
37 (1). P 121-140 
Pew Research Center. 2013. “Japanese Public’s Mood Rebounding, Abe Highly 
Popular.” July 11. http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/07/Pew-Research-Center-
Global-Attitudes-Project-Japan-Report-FINAL-July-11-2013.pdf (March 14, 2016)  
Silverman, David, and Amir Mavasti. 2008. Doing Qualitative Research: A 
Comprehensive Guide. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Sinkkonen, Elina. 2013. “Nationalism, Patriotism and Foreign Policy Attitudes among 
Chinese University Students”. China Quarterly. Vol 216. P 1045-1063 
Suzuki, Shogo. 2007. “The importance of ‘Othering’ in China's national identity: Sino-
Japanese relations as a stage of identity conflicts.” Pacific Review. Vol 20 (1). P 23-47. 
38 
 
Volkan, Vamik D. 2001. “Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: As 
Aspect of Large-Group Identity.” Group Analysis. Vol 34 (1). P 79-97 
Wan, Ming. 2014. “Coevolution and Sino-Japanese Tensions.” Asia-Pacific Review. 
Vol 21 (1). P 30-40 
Wirth, Christian. 2009. “China, Japan, and East Asian Regional Cooperation: The 
Views of “Self” and “Other” from Beijing and Tokyo.” International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacific. Vol 9 (3). P 469-496. 
  
39 
 
EXTRAS 
Extra 1: Interview Topic Guide 
Introductory questions: 
1. How do you like Japan? 
2. What about Japanese pop-culture and their products? Their economy? 
3. How much do you use their products? Listen to their music, watch their movies? 
Explanations, going deeper: 
4. Why do you/don’t you like Japan? 
5. History (ask for explanations)  
a. WWII, Nanjing, etc. 
b. Explain some historical event related to Japan 
6. Politics  
Information sources: 
7. Where did you learn about it?  
a. Parents 
b. School 
c. Media 
d. Friends  
e. What have they told you? What have you talked about? 
8. What do you think is the official standpoint towards Japan? 
Patriotism and differences among the general population: 
9. Patriotism 
10. Differences between different generations 
11. Differences between different educational backgrounds 
Ending remarks: 
Do you have anything to add?  
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Extra 2: List of interviews 
Interview 1 
December 19, 2015; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
Interviewee: Jing, female, 23 years old, major in environmental engineering 
Length of the interview: 18min 36sec 
Interview 2 
January 17, 2016; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
Interviewee: Chen, male, 24 years old, major in hydraulic engineering 
Length of the interview: 24min 47sec 
Interview 3 
January 17, 2016; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
Interviewee: Huan, male, 24 years old, major in electrical engineering 
Length of the interview: 36min 5sec 
Interview 4 
January 18, 2016; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
Interviewee: Li, male, age: major in international journalism 
Length of the interview: 20min 51sec 
Interview 5 
January 18, 2016; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
Interviewee: Ting, female, 23 years old, major in international journalism and 
communications 
Length of the interview: 21min 52sec 
Interview 6 
January 18, 2016; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
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Interviewee: Zhen, female, 24 years old, major in earth sciences  
Length of the interview: 21min 01sec 
Interview 7 
January 19, 2016; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
Interviewees: Ai, female, 23 years old, major in software engineering 
Length of the interview: 29min 32sec 
Interview 8 
January 19, 2016; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
Interviewees: Chun, male, 24 years old, major in software engineering 
Length of the interview: 29min 32sec 
Interview 9 
January 19, 2016; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
Interviewee: Peng, male, 24 years old, major in chemical engineering 
Length of the interview: 21min 44sec 
Interview 10 
January 20, 2016; Tsinghua University, Asian Youth Exchange Center 
Interviewer: Kai Kreos 
Interviewee: Shu, female, 23 years old, major in mechanical engineering 
Length of the interview: 21min 18sec 
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KOKKUVÕTE 
Käesoleva bakalaureusetöö eesmärgiks oli välja selgitada, kuidas suhtuvad Hiina 
noored Jaapanisse ja kuidas suhestub see Neumanni (1996) “mina” ja “teised” 
teoreetilise raamistikuga. Kuigi Hiina rahvusliku identiteedi kujunemist läbi suhtluse 
“teistega” ja eelkõige Jaapaniga on käsitlenud paljud uurimused (Suzuki 2007; 
Atanassova-Cornelis 2012), põhinevad need kõik eeldusel, et Hiina avalikkus näeb 
Jaapanit kui negatiivset ja monoliitilist “teist”.  Seejuures ei ole varasemad tööd suutnud 
analüüsida individuaalseid arvamusi keeruliste ja vastuoluliste teemade osas ning pole 
tõestanud, et selline negatiivne suhtumine iseloomustab ka Hiina kõrgelt haritud noori. 
Antud uurimustöö keskendub seega just kõrgharitud Hiina noortele ja üritab 
kvalitatiivse sisuanalüüsi abil analüüsida nende  suhtumisi ja mõtteid.  
Uurimustöö esimene peatükk annab ülevaate uurimuse teoreetilisest raamistikust. 
Seejuures keskendub autor esiteks rahvusluse ja rahvusliku identiteedi tekkimisele läbi 
suhtluse “teistega” ning selgitab seejärel täpsemalt seda, kuidas on välja kujunenud 
Hiina rahvuslus ja nende “mina” ning millist rolli mängib selles Jaapan. Sellele järgneb 
uurimusraamistiku ja metodoloogia kirjeldus, mis annab ülevaate uurimisprotsessist. 
Nimelt intervjueeriti antud töö tarbeks kümmet Tsinghua Ülikooli magistritaseme 
tudengit ning viidi seejärel läbi kvalitatiivne sisuanalüüs, mille tulemusi analüüsiti 
lähtudes “mina” ja “teised” teoreetilisest raamistikust. Bakalaureusetöö analüüs on 
jagatud kahte suuremasse alapeatükki, millest esimene annab ülevaate noorte vastanute 
üldisest suhtumisest Jaapanisse ning eristab seejuures kultuuri, iseloomu ja tehnoloogia 
ning ajaloo ja poliitika vahel. Teises alapeatükis otsitakse põhjendusi neile suhtumisele.  
Analüüsi käigus selgus, et uurimuses osalenud noored tudengid olid väga 
eneseteadlikud ning nägid Jaapanit väga mitmekülgselt. Kuigi Jaapanit nähti üldiselt kui 
negatiivset “teist”, ilmnes, et olenevalt ajahetkest ja käsitletavast teemast nägid noored 
enda ja Jaapani vahel ka mõningaid positiivseid erinevusi ja isegi sarnasusi. Seejuures 
suutsid vastanud eristada Jaapani kultuuri, tehnoloogiat ja muid valdkondi poliitikast, ja 
mitte peegeldada Jaapani poliitikute tegusid ja otsuseid kogu populatsioonile. 
Kuigi intervjueeritavad suutsid näha Hiina ja Jaapani vahel positiivseid erinevusi ja ka 
mõningaid sarnasusi, muutus nende suhtumine oluliselt negatiivsemaks, kui teemad 
liikusid kultuurilt, tehnoloogialt ja inimestelt ajaloo ja poliitika suunas. Seejuures 
tundus tudengite negatiivne nägemus Jaapanist pärinevat enim ajaloolisest perioodist, 
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mida kirjeldatakse ka kui häbistuse ajastut (Callahan 2004), ja eelkõige sündmustest, 
nagu Teine Maailmasõda ja Nanjingi massimõrv. Samas tundsid intervjueeritavad, et 
tänane poliitiline olukord ja Jaapani liidrite käitumisviis tugevdab seda negatiivset 
nägemust veelgi.  
Noorte vastanute kaalutletud mõtteviis tundus olevat selgitatav läbi erinevate faktorite, 
nagu vanus, haridus, kogemus ja otsene kontakt jaapanlastega. Selgus, et negatiivsed 
nägemused pärinesid eelkõige koolist, meediast ja televisioonist, mis kõik väljendavad 
Hiina valitsuse ametlikku seisukohta. Positiivsed nägemused tulenesid vähesel määral 
meediast, kuid eelkõige isiklikust kontaktist Jaapani inimeste, toodete ja kultuuriga. 
Intervjueeritavad tundsid, et nende noor vanus, kõrge haridustase ja kontakt 
jaapanlastega on neil võimaldanud välja kujundada väga mitmekülgse arvamuse 
Jaapanist, ning et just see eristab neid ka vanematest generatsioonidest ja madalama 
haridustasemega inimestest. 
Kokkuvõttes võib väita, et uurimuses osalenud noorte tudengite mõttemaailm oli üsnagi 
keeruline ja mitmekülgne, kuid erinevalt varasematele uurimustele väidab siinne, et 
kõik hiinlased ei näe Jaapanit kui vaid negatiivset “teist”. Läbi viidud intervjuud 
vihjasid hoopis sellele, et kõrgelt haritud Hiina noorte arvamus ja suhtumine on erinev 
olenevalt sellest, millist teemat käsitletakse. Samas on antud uurimuses kasutatud valimi 
suurus liiga väike, et teha üldistusi. Seetõttu vajab antud temaatika veel edasist uurimist.  
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